Abstract. We consider constructions for cryptographic hash functions based on m-bit block ciphers. First we present a new attack on the LOKI-DBH mode: the attack nds collisions in 2 3m=4 encryptions, which should be compared to 2 m encryptions for a brute force attack. This attack breaks the last remaining subclass in a wide class of e cient hash functions which have been proposed in the literature. We then analyze hash functions based on a collision resistant compression function for which nding a collision requires at least 2 m encryptions, providing a lower bound of the complexity of collisions of the hash function. A new class of constructions is proposed, based on error correcting codes over GF(2 2 ) and a proof of security is given, which relates their security to that of single block hash functions. For example, a compression function is presented which requires about 4 encryptions to hash an m-bit block, and for which nding a collision requires at least 2 m encryptions. This scheme has the same hash rate as MDC-4, but better security against collision attacks. Our method can be used to construct compression functions with even higher levels of security at the cost of more internal memory.
Introduction
Hash functions are functions which map a string of arbitrary size to a short string of xed length (typically 128. . . 160 bits). Hash functions which satisfy security properties (collision resistance, second preimage resistance, and preimage resistance) are widely used in cryptographic applications such as digital signatures, password protection schemes, and conventional message authentication.
We consider hash functions based on block ciphers with block length and key length both equal to m bits. Such a block cipher de nes, for each m-bit key, a permutation on m-bit strings. The main argument to construct hash functions based on block ciphers is the minimization of the design and implementation e ort. Additionally, the trust in existing block ciphers can be transferred to hash functions. These arguments are historically very important (DES 10] was seen as a main building block for practical cryptography), and have gained more importance due to the recent cryptanalytical successes achieved by H. Dobbertin 7, 8] on custom designed hash functions such as MD4 26] and MD5 27] . The main disadvantage of this approach is that speci c hash functions are likely to be more e cient. One also has to take into account that legal restrictions on the use and import or export of hash functions might be weaker than those applying to encryption algorithms. Finally, block ciphers may exhibit some weaknesses that are only important if they are used in a hashing mode. The (semi)-weak keys of DES and the corresponding xed points 20] , and the key schedule weakness of SAFER 13] are good illustrations of this fact.
We de ne the hash rate of a hash function based on an m-bit block cipher as the number of m-bit message blocks processed per encryption or decryption.
After the publication of several weak proposals in the late 1970s, the rst secure constructions for a hash function based on a block cipher were the scheme by Matyas, Meyer, and Oseas 18] and its dual, which is widely known as the Davies-Meyer scheme 1 . Both schemes have rate 1, and give a hash result of only m bits (which explains the name single block length hash functions). Finding a collision for such a scheme using the birthday paradox 30] requires about 2 m=2 encryptions, while nding a (second) preimage requires about 2 m encryptions. Later it was shown that there exist essentially two secure single block length hash functions in this model, and that 12 di erent schemes can be obtained by applying a linear transformation to the inputs 24] . One of these schemes has been speci ed in ISO/IEC 10118 12] .
Since most block ciphers have a block length of m = 64 bits, the need for double block length hash functions became apparent. The goal of these constructions is to achieve a security level against brute force collision attacks of at least 2 m encryptions. Three main classes of hash functions have been proposed: { Hash functions with rate 1 and with an internal memory of 2m bits; most of these constructions have been broken (see for example 14]), a notable exception being the LOKI-DBH mode proposed at Auscrypt'90 4]. In this paper it will be shown that a collision attack for this hash function requires only 2 3m=4 encryptions; the attack is more general and shows that there are no hash functions in this class for which nding a collision requires more than 2 3m=4 operations.
{ MDC-2 (rate 1/2) and MDC- encryptions is required, which is not o ered by any of the current proposals. Moreover, a similar or higher security level for preimage attacks would be desirable as well.
In this paper we try to resolve this problem by proposing a new e cient construction for a hash function based on a block cipher for which nding a collision requires at least 2 qm=2 encryptions (with q 2), and nding a preimage requires at least 2 qm encryptions. For q = 2, the constructions are more e cient than existing proposals with the same security level. The new constructions result in a parallelizable hash function, the security of which can be related to that of the well known single block length hash functions. The basic ingredients of the scheme will be the use of a larger internal memory and a quaternary error correcting code.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In x2 we review a general model and some properties of hash functions. x3 gives the new attack on the LOKI-DBH mode. In x4 it is shown that extending the existing schemes to triple and quadruple solutions does not result in an improved security level. Our new construction for a hash function based on block ciphers is presented in x5, and x6 contains the conclusions.
Hash Functions
A hash function is an easily implementable mapping from the set of all binary sequences to the set of binary sequences of some xed length. Almost all hash functions described in the literature are iterated hash functions, i.e., they are based on an easily computable function h( ; ) from two binary sequences of respective lengths m and l to a binary sequence of length m. The message M is split into blocks M i of l bits or M = (M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : ; M n ). If the length of M is not a multiple of l, M is padded using an unambiguous padding rule. The value H n of length m is obtained by computing iteratively H i = h(H i?1 ; M i ) i = 1; 2; : : :; t ; (1) where H 0 is a speci ed initial value denoted with IV . The function h is called the compression function or the hash round function. The hash result is then obtained by applying an output transformation g to H n , or Hash(IV; M) = H = g(H t ). Note that the output transformation is often the identity function.
The theoretical work on the security of hash functions has concentrated on the reduction of the security of Hash( ) to that of h( ; ) 5, 16, 19, 21] . For these reductions to work in practice, we need to append an additional block at the end of the input string which contains its length. This operation, proposed independently by R. Merkle 19] and I. Damg ard 5] is known as MD-strengthening. If MD-strengthening is used, one can prove the following connection between the security of a hash function and of its compression function. Theorem 1. Let Hash( ) be an iterated hash function with MD-strengthening.
Then preimage and collision attacks on Hash( ; ) (where an attacker can choose IV freely) have about the same complexity as the corresponding attacks on h( ; ). Note that in practical applications, the IV of a hash function is xed in the speci cations. This might lead to a higher security level; Theorem 1 gives a lower bound on the security of Hash(IV; ).
The use of a secure compression function h( ; ) allows for the replacement of the iterative construction by a parallelizable tree construction 5].
In view of the above, it is remarkable that most practical hash functions do not have a collision resistant compression function (the most important exceptions are the DES based hash functions of R. Merkle 19] ). For the rst class of hash functions (as discussed in x1) it was shown that collisions for the compres- where L is a binary 3 4 matrix. This includes all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1 (serial or parallel), as de ned in (2), but also more complex schemes. Also, we will rewrite A and B of (3) . For all but two classes of hash functions, the complexity of the collision attack is at most 4 2 m=2 .
Proof: Consider the general form (2) . In the following we will attack the We present meet-in-themiddle attacks which are faster than brute-force attacks and distinguish between the (second) preimage attack and the collision attack.
The (second) preimage attack: It is clear that we cannot meet both our requirements above. Indeed, it will be possible to make the inputs to one of the subfunctions (e.g., H A similar result holds for quadruple block length hash functions. One iteration will involve at least ve variables. One can make the inputs to two of the subfunctions constant by an appropriate choice of the input variables; the remaining freedom, corresponding to one variable, can be used for a brute force collision search on the other two subfunctions.
In the next section we show that hash functions exist meeting our two requirements for schemes with n > 4.
A New General Construction
In this section we present a new general construction for a collision resistant hash function based on an m-bit block cipher, that is, where collisions will take more than 2 m operations. The construction extends a simple hash mode which is believed to be secure to a multiple hash mode. The security of the new construction can be proved based on the following two assumptions:
{ the simple hash mode is secure; { no shortcuts can be found to break independent instances of the simple hash mode.
First we make the assumptions more precise, and subsequently we present a new construction and prove that its security can be derived from the assumptions. Then extensions of the construction are discussed and a complete example is provided.
Security assumptions
We now state the two assumptions required to prove the security of the new construction.
Assumption 1 (Davies-Meyer) Let . Assume that the output of the compression function depends on all 2k blocks, and, more precisely, the matrix of the a ne expansion mapping has rank 2k. This assumption can be justi ed with an appropriate assumption about the underlying block cipher of a multiple Davies-Meyer compression function. More precisely, consider 2 di erent subfunctions f i and f j and assume that the inputs to one subfunction f i are dependent on the inputs to another subfunction f j . Then if the block cipher is secure, we assume that two inputs colliding for f i will collide also for f j with probability 2 ?m . In other words, our assumption is that, if the block cipher is secure, nding collisions simultaneously for f i and f j for dependent inputs will not be easier than a brute-force attack.
Consider a multiple Davies-Meyer compression function with n subfunctions and assume that a simultaneous collision have been found as discussed in Assumption 2. Since the rank of the submatrix of the N functions ff j g is N ? v, it will be possible to nd collisions for N ?v of these functions independently of each other. Our assumption then says that nding simultaneous collisions also for the remaining v functions requires at least 2 vm=2 encryptions, and nding a simultaneous (second) preimage requires at least 2 vm encryptions. Thus, the best an attacker can hope for is a brute force attack on the v remaining functions.
The new construction
The following theorem describes the new construction and gives a proof for its security. (2 2 ). These elements are encoded using a quaternary n; k; d] code, resulting in n elements of GF (2 2 ).
Each of these elements represents the 2-bit inputs to one of the n functions. The individual input bits are obtained by representing the elements of GF (2 2 ) as a vector space over GF (2) . This construction guarantees that the conditions for Assumption 2 are satis ed for the value v = d ?1. By a linear transformation of the 2k inputs it is possible to obtain a compression function, where the inputs to the rst k subfunctions are independent of each other. The inputs to the last n ? k subfunctions will depend on the inputs to the rst k subfunctions. The minimum distance of the quaternary code ensures that the inputs to at least d?1 of the last n ? k functions will depend on the inputs to the rst k functions. Since n ? k d ? 1 17] the result follows immediately.
The security bound will be slightly smaller than indicated, since a number of key bits have to be xed. However, n = O(m), and thus the resulting reduction of the security level will be negligible. The above bound is a lower bound and the existence of attacks meeting this bound is not guaranteed. Later we give a concrete proposal of a compression function constructed as above, for which the complexity of the best known attacks are even higher than the proven lower bound. proving a stronger security bound is probably quite di cult.
Extensions
The construction has the property that the size of the hash result is larger than the security level of the hash function would suggest. This could be a problem in applications where`near collisions' are not acceptable 1] (e.g., it is feasible to nd two hash values which have n?d+1 colliding blocks). In that case, an output transformation can be de ned which compresses the result of the nal iteration.
We present here two approaches, which do not a ect the provable security (both techniques can be combined; an example is given in x 5.4 below).
Denote with n min the smallest possible value of n for a given value of d, such that Theorem 3 holds (e.g., for d = 3, n min = 5, and d = 4, n min = 9). If n min < n, compress the n blocks to n min blocks using the new construction with n min parallel blocks (since n min < n, this hash function will have a lower rate than the original one).
If a reduction is required to less than n min blocks, one can use a number of parallel and independent instances of Merkle's hash function based on a block cipher 19]. This will be rather slow compared to the new construction, but this is not so important since Merkle's function is only required for the output transformation.
A practical example
We present the details of a concrete proposal based on an 8; encryptions. Later we describe the best attacks we have found, which requires even more encryptions.
The generator matrix of the 8; 5; 3] Hamming code over GF (2 2 ) has the following form: In addition, the 8 functions are made di erent by xing the values of 3 key bits to the block cipher.
Although we have proved a lower bound on the complexity of attacks on the above compression function we have not succeeded in nding such attacks. Indeed the best collision attack we know is the following. encryptions of the block cipher. We need to x three bits of the key, which gives a security level for collision attacks of about 2 81 for m = 64.
In the case of DES 10], one needs to x an additional 2 key bits in order to avoid the complementation property, and the (semi-)weak keys and the associated (anti-) xed points (bits 2 and 3 of the key are xed to 01 2]). Since DES has a 56-bit key, the e ective key size will be reduced to 51 bits, resulting in a security level of 2 4 51=3 = 2 68 . By xing two key bits and three plaintext bits, this could be improved to 2
72
, which seems to be su cient to preclude brute force collision search at the cost of a more complex implementation. The order of the chaining variables above was chosen to ensure that the message variables do not occur as key input to the block cipher. The most important reason for this is to obtain a hash rate of 1/4 since the key size is less than the block size in DES; moreover, this avoids giving an attacker the advantage in`real' attacks on the hash function with a xed value of IV (compared to attacks on the compression function) of being able to choose the keys.
A reduction of the eight 64-bit blocks to three 64-bit blocks using two parallel instantiations of Merkle's construction (resulting in a rate of about 0:25 0:5 = 1=8) requires about 64 DES encryptions.
Note that the 2 m complexity of MDC-2 is the best known attack against the hash function, while against Merkle's scheme and our schemes the 2 m complexity is against the compression functions and is a lower bound for the complexity of an attack on the hash function. The complexity of the best known attack against the compression function of MDC-2 is only 2 m=2 .
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that designing e cient hash functions with minimal internal memory based on an m-bit block cipher is a di cult problem. Moreover, none of the previous proposals provides a protection better than 2 m against brute force collision search. By changing the model slightly (i.e., by increasing the size of the internal memory, and by introducing an output transformation), it is possible to obtain a compression function and thus a hash function for which the security can be proved based on a plausible assumption. The proposed construction achieve the same e ciency as the best current proposals (namely rate 1/4, or 4 encryptions to hash a single block) but a higher security level, or a higher e ciency for the same security level. For large value of the internal memory, rates close to one can be obtained. Also, the constructions allows for a high degree of parallelism, which will yield even more e cient implementations.
